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Productivity and Efficiency Impacts of Human Resources Practices in Food Retailing
I. Introduction 
The retail food industry has undergone significant changes since the 1980s as
supermarkets responded to increased competition from alternative retail formats and changes in
consumer shopping habits.  Competition from warehouse clubs, mass merchandisers,
supercenters, and convenience stores has intensified, forcing supermarkets to reevaluate many of
the ways in which they conducted their business operations.  A significant problem in food
retailing has emerged in human resource management and hiring practices.  Progressive Grocer
(2003) noted that while food retailing has long prided itself on being a people business, the recent
track record “tells a different story--one of a sector that seems bent on perpetuating a vicious
cycle of focusing on today's operating efficiencies at the expense of tomorrow's front-line work
force.”
Human resource (HR) managers in retailing recognize the relationship between business
performance and the firm’s human resources strategy and benefits policies.  Retail employers and
trade associations conduct detailed surveys of employment and hiring trends to identify and
benchmark best practices in training, compensation, benefits, recruiting and the controlling costs
of turnover.  The biannual Survey of Unit Level Employment Practices (SULEP) is featured on
food industry websites offering updated information for store managers, operators and human
resource professionals in the food industry.  Industry consultants emphasize the importance of a
linkage between business strategy and HR strategy in designing compensation and flexible
benefits plan for employees. 
Recent changes in the retail food industry have increased interest in studying how human
resource practices impact performance.  Multi-establishment chains in the industry have
2traditionally operated with hierarchical and centralized human resources practices while single
unit establishments have the leeway to pursue a variety of alternative staffing and management
practices.  Declining unionization, increased use of part-time workers, and technological changes
have altered the retail food labor market at the same time that traditional food retailers have
encountered increasing competition from non-traditional food sellers.  Major food retailers have
been forced to adapt quickly in order to survive, with many making changes in marketing,
pricing, and service strategies. Some food retailers have focused on customer service and
expanded the labor- and training-intensive services they offer,  including more prepared food
items, bakeries and other services. Such strategies suggest that understanding the link between
human resource practices and performance is important as supermarket managers face increased
competition from discount retailers like Wal-Mart.
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the impact of human resource policies
on productivity and technical efficiency in food retailing establishments.  A stochastic frontier
analysis based on a  performance measure used by food retailers is related to store level human
resource practices.  Data for the study are from the Supermarket Panel, which gathers detailed
information on store characteristics, operations, and performance.  The normal-gamma stochastic
frontier model provides a flexible parameterization of the inefficiency distribution in the
stochastic frontier.  Discussion of the implications for evaluating store performance along with
directions for future research conclude the paper. 
The Supermarket Panel used in the analysis features detailed information on human
resources management practices at the store level.  Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) highlight the
value of “insider econometrics” to identify empirically the economic impact of human resource
3management practices.  Black and Lynch (2001) emphasize the value of focusing on HR
practices associated with specific production processes (here, food retailing) to reduce problems
due to heterogeneity in production and external market events.  Synergies between a set of HR
practices and their impacts on productivity can be readily investigated using establishment-level
data.  However, little research is currently available to guide retailers on HR practices that most
effectively stimulate productivity and efficiency at the store level. 
In the retail environment we focus on gross margins (value added) to evaluate
performance, providing a contrast to the sales per employee measure which is frequently used in
the analysis of productivity trends.  Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) measure
establishment-level labor productivity in retailing using real gross output or nominal sales
deflated by four-digit industry deflators and total hours for the labor input (total hours).  The
value added measure we propose closely aligns with the objectives of the retail chain and is
readily linked to financial metrics that are evaluated by store managers, retail executives, and
industry analysts. 
II. Modeling Efficiency in Food Retailing 
Stochastic production frontier models, summarized comprehensively in Kumbhakar and
Lovell (2000), allow both for technical inefficiency and random shocks that are uncontrolled by
decision makers and managers.  Stochastic frontier analysis assumes a composite error term
iconsisting of two random variables.  The first element in the composite error, < , is a symmetric
noise term reflecting random noise which influences store decisions and can take on both
ipositive and negative values.  The asymmetric inefficiency error term, u , accounts for technical
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and managerial constraints and assumes only nonnegative values.  A typical specification for a
stochastic frontier model is 
i i iwhere y  represents the observed output measure for the ith establishment, f(x , z ) is the
i ideterministic frontier with inputs x and operational measures denoted by z .  The <  are mean zero
ii.i.d. random variables which are assumed to be independent of u  and the explanatory variables
vwhile following a normal distribution with mean 0 and  variance F .   Technical inefficiency is2
irepresented by the one-sided error term, u , that follows a half-normal distribution with mean :
u iand variance F .   Technical inefficiency is represented by the nonnegative random variable u2
with a continuous density, f(u | 2), where 2 is a vector of parameters.  The formulation of the
inefficiency distribution is based on a gamma distribution from Greene (2003): 
The normal-gamma stochastic frontier model provides a more flexible parameterization of the
inefficiency distribution in the stochastic frontier model than either of the usual alternatives such
as normal-half normal or normal-exponential.  
IiTechnical efficiency is estimated as TE  = exp( -u   ), which has a value between 0 and 1,
^
with 1 indicating an efficient food retailing establishment.  Only the difference between the
i i irandom error terms ,  =  <  - u  can be observed, requiring a derivation to extract technical
i iefficiency u  from , .   Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) discuss methods to obtain estimates of
I i itechnical efficiency for each producer by deriving u  from the conditional distribution E( u  | ,  ).^
(2)
5Empirical Model of Supermarket Operations
The Supermarket Panel is an annual, nation-wide survey of supermarkets that collects
data on store characteristics, operating practices, and performance. The Panel was established in
1998 by The Food Industry Center (TFIC) at the University of Minnesota as a basis for ongoing
study of the supermarket industry. Surveys were designed and tested in store visits to food
retailing establishments. The surveys are mailed directly to store managers each January. In close
consultation with supermarket managers the survey information is used to prepare confidential
customized benchmark reports comparing the performance of the manager’s store to a peer group
of stores similar in size and format. Based on field visits scores for six key management areas –
supply chain, human resources, food handling, environmental practices, quality assurance, and
service offerings – were identified as critical components that managers and store department
heads would find useful in evaluating and benchmarking their performance. Refinements of the
model and a comparison of our results with existing industry data along with checks on the
interpretation of store performance metrics were obtained by meeting with a leading food
retailing consulting firm, Willard Bishop Consulting. 
The Panel is unique because the unit of analysis is the individual store. In contrast,
findings presented in the Annual Report of the Grocery Industry published by Progressive
Grocer and the Food Marketing Institute’s annual SPEAKS report are based on company-level
responses for representative stores. Data collection procedures for the 2002 Supermarket panel,
sampled from nearly 32,000 supermarkets in the U.S., are described in detail by King, Jacobson,
and Seltzer (2002) and the variables for the model are presented in table 1. 
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A translog production function for the food retailing establishment is based on value
added as the output measure along with measures of the operational and environmental
constraints facing the supermarket.  Store performance depends on store size (SSize), the hiring
of full-time labor (FTHrs) and part-time labor hours (PTHrs) along with store-level
qorganizational and operational factors (z ) that influence performance so that the model is
written: 
The second-order terms in the translog production frontier in equation 3 are represented by
mnk(SSize, FTHrs, PTHRs) with estimated coefficients of $ .  Operational characteristics of the
store and workplace (the z vector) are discussed below. 
The output measure for the retail store is weekly gross margin, defined as weekly sales
minus the cost of goods sold.  Baily and Solow (2001) suggested that value-added generated by
retailers is the best measure of retailing output.  They note that the value-added measure of
output reflects the amount of retail services that are provided, such as the variety of merchandise
provided, convenience of store location, availability of checkout and food department personnel,
along with the availability of in-store services. 
Results from summary income statements of conventional supermarkets confirm a close
relationship between value-added measures and labor productivity at the store level.  The Food
Marketing Institute (2000) reported that the most profitable food retailers invested a higher
percentage of expenses in personnel compared to lower performing supermarkets, even though
7overall expenses for the top performers were lower than those for the least profitable stores.  
Payroll as a percentage of total expenses was at 47.5% for the most profitable stores and 41.9% 
for the least profitable stores.  High performing stores use managerial skills and operational
methods to control overall expenses more effectively and to maintain high gross margins. 
The two inputs considered in this analysis are store selling area and weekly labor hours. 
Store selling area is a rough measure of the capital used in a retail operation.  Store energy costs
and other major capital inputs, such as refrigeration equipment and lighting, shelving and display
cases, and front-end checkout equipment are highly correlated with store selling area. 
The impact of workforce composition on retail performance is measured by the store’s
use of full-time and part-time workers.  The labor inputs are full-time labor hours and part-time
labor hours. Oi (1992) noted that reliance on part-time workers is an indicator of the skill mix of
the retail work force.  Increases in the use of part-time employees are driven partly by larger store
sizes and larger stores must pay higher wages because their employees supply more work effort. 
Larger stores must hire more clerks and these employees are more productive because they waste
less time in waiting for customers.  Higher wages are paid to more productive employees, leading
Oi (1992) to conclude that productivity gains associated with sales volumes in food retailing are
relatively greater for part-time employees.  The empirical model allows us to evaluate the relative
impact of full-time and part-time employees on store performance as measured by value added. 
An index of human resource practices is the key measure used in the study and is defined 
for each food retailing establishment based on data from the Supermarket Panel survey. An index
of human resource practices (HRIndex) at each food retailing establishment is defined from the
Supermarket Panel. The HR index consists of three components related to training and workforce
8characteristics along with two measures of the benefits and incentives offered to full-time and
part-time employees.  
A number of studies demonstrate that particular human resource practices are
complementary and contribute to improving firm performance, with the leading studies
summarized in Zwick (2004).  The “high performance work systems” mentioned in labor
literature include employee involvement programs such as self-managed work teams, incentive
programs along with profit sharing and other human resource practices incorporating formal
training programs.  Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) find that innovative employment
practices tend to be complements and that human resource policies are important determinants of
productivity. Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001) demonstrated that personnel policy,
defined as wage level and growth along with worker turnover, has a strong relation to firm
economic performance, measured as value added minus total wage costs.  Building on this
literature, we identify a set of HR practices which are predominant in food retailing.
The HR index includes information on (1) training hours for new hires in cashiers and
other positions (NwEmpTrn), (2) hours of training for store managers, grocery department
managers, and scanning coordinators (KyEmpTrn), and (3) the relative proportion of full-time to
part-time employees hired at the store (FtPtRati).  Managers report the hours of training in
classroom settings or one-on-one supervision given to new hires in cashier positions and
elsewhere in the store during the first week and during the first 26 weeks of employment. 
Information on the number of training hours in the past 12 months for key employees such as the
store manager, grocery department manager, and pricing coordinator are also available. 
9The HR index also relies on information about the compensation package of benefits and
incentives offered to full-time or part-time employees (IBComp).  The benefits include individual
health insurance, family health insurance, disability insurance, a company funded pension, and a
401(k) plan.  The menu of incentives indicate whether the firm offers an annual bonus, uses
individual performance incentive pay, provides incentive pay based on product or category
performance, or has an employee stock ownership plan. The index, constructed as a count of the
number of benefits and incentives provided, is consistent with empirical work on benefits
offerings by firms based on dichotomous indicators for whether or not firms provide benefits
(Brown and Medoff, 2003). We consulted with U.S. Census Bureau economists who have
examined the link between fringe benefits choices and firm performance using integrated data on
firms, their employees, and their benefits offerings from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics Program (Decressin et al. 2007). Mok and Yeung (2005) use a
stochastic frontier model to examine the effect of employee motivation, which is influenced by
bonus incentives and flexibility in employment, on the technical efficiency of foreign-financed
manufacturing firms in southern China.
A final component of the HR index measures the firm’s policy of providing a uniform
compensation package of benefits and incentives to both full-time and part-time employees alike
(UnifComp).  The variable is formed as a count measure of the number of benefits and incentives
that are offered to both sets of employees.  Researchers in organization theory have adopted
equity theory as a fundamental model for understanding the motivation of workers in
organizations. Katz (2000) noted that equity theory, developed by Stacey Adams and supported
through decades of research, argues that workers assess the fairness of their rewards (earnings
10
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and compensation) by comparing both their outcomes and their inputs with those received by
their co-workers. Zenger and Lazzarini (2004) emphasize employee concerns about fairness in
pay and compensation along with the propensity of employees to compare their pay and
compensation as factors which constrain the manager’s ability to reward individual and group
performance. 
Food retailers achieving high value added (above the sample mean) tend to adopt uniform
benefits packages as about 46 percent of these establishments provide 4 or more benefits equally
to full-time and part-time employees.  For the stores with low performance on the value added
measure, 85 percent do not offer any of the same benefits to both types of employees. 
To summarize, the HR index consists of five measures: new employee training
(NwEmpTrn), training of key employees department managers (KyEmpTrn), the relative
proportion of full-time to part-time employees (FtPtRati), benefits and incentives offered to full-
time and part-time employees (IBComp), and the uniformity of benefits and incentives provided
to employees (UnifComp). The measures capture different components of the human resource
strategies pursued by the food retailers as the bivariate correlations between the measures are
generally small and below 0.20.  Each measure is standardized by subtracting its mean and
dividing by the standard error represented by:
The combined measure of human resource practices for food retailing establishments is defined
following Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) as 
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A second store characteristic is the number of stores under common ownership which
measures firm size.  Membership in a larger group (GSize) may boost productivity through
multistore economies in procurement and advertising and through centralization of some
managerial functions. Hoppe (2002) commented on the empirical regularity that large firms tend
to adopt new technology sooner than small firms as the larger firms expect a greater return from
adoption. Food retailing chains may benefit from multiplant economies in the adoption and
diffusion of technological innovations and generate savings in nonproduction costs such as
transportation, distribution and inventory control while taking advantage of the economies of
massed reserves along with information sharing between establishments. 
A third organizational descriptor is a binary variable equal to zero if the store is
wholesaler supplied and one if the store is part of a self-distributing group (SelfDist). Stores and
distribution centers are under common ownership in self-distributing chains, facilitating
coordination between these two segments of the retail supply chain and enhancing productivity
gains. Stores in self-distributing groups, which account for about 37 percent of the sampled
stores, report a value added figure that is over 2.5 times higher than that recorded by wholesaler
supplied stores.  
Stores in self-distributing groups also provide higher levels of benefits and incentives for
both full-time and part-time workers. Self-distributing firms have benefits packages which are
more likely to treat full-time and part-time employees equally as 49 percent of the firms offer
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four of more of the same benefits to these employees. Wholesaler-supplied establishments
typically treat full-time and part-time workers differently and about 43 percent do not provide
any benefits that are shared by sets of employees. 
Unionization is an organizational factor that may affect productivity if having a unionized
workforce is associated with significant differences in worker skills and/or workforce stability. 
A binary variable equal to one if at least 25% of the workforce is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement and zero otherwise is also included in the empirical model, resulting in
about 24% of the stores identified as unionized. Unionized stores register high performance for
the value added measure, with a dollar amount that is over 2 times higher than non-unionized
stores.  
Distribution service levels are closely related to store format, the fifth measure of store
organization. King, Jacobson, and Seltzer (2002) report considerable variation in median store
characteristics and performance measures for stores grouped by format. Binary variables for these
format categories are included in the empirical model. Stores in the Supermarket Panel are
grouped into four mutually exclusive, exhaustive format categories based on store size and
distribution service offerings. The store format categories include conventional stores,  food/drug
combinations, supercenters, and warehouse / super warehouse formats (Convl, FoodDrug,
SCenter, Superstore). 
III. Model Estimation and Results
Estimates of the normal-gamma model using the method of maximum simulated
likelihood estimation were obtained following Greene (2003).  King and Park (2004) provide
support for the specification which treats store size and labor as exogenous in modeling
13
productivity in supermarket operations.  Coefficient estimates and asymptotic standard errors for
the model are presented in table 2.  
Discussion of the model results centers around three issues.  First, the key factors that
influence retail store performance along with the estimated factor elasticities and measures of
returns to scale are presented.  Our overall results align with those presented by Black and Lynch
(2001) which highlight the productivity-enhancing effects of unionization and a specific set of
workplace practices.  Second, the stochastic frontier approach allows us to identify the technical
efficiency of human resource practices and link efficiency effects to financial performance, an
effect which has been neglected in previous work.  We also show that the results are robust to the 
potential presence of endogeneity. 
Factors Influencing Retail Store Performance
The coefficients associated with the store categories indicate how supermarket
performance across each format compares with the average supermarket in the sample.  The null
hypothesis that the format effects (conventional, food/drug combination, supercenter, and
warehouse / super warehouse) are jointly equal to zero is not rejected as the calculated P  value2
3of 1.160 was below the critical value P  of 9.49 at the 95% confidence level.  The store format2
variables were subsequently excluded from the model.  
Industry surveys such as Points of Impact Retail Operations Survey typically compile
average gross margins across different store formats such as conventional supermarkets, upscale,
discount, and superstores, both upscale and conventional (National Grocers Association, 2005). 
Gross margins may vary from 32% for upscale stores to 23% for conventional stores with similar
margin breakdowns presented for specific departments such as grocery, meat, general
14
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merchandise, produce and so on.  Our findings suggest that after controlling for inputs such as
store size and labor use (including benefits and incentives) store formats are not a significant
component influencing observed value added margins.  Retail analysts who focus on store
formats as a key feature influencing performance (gross margins) may be neglecting other store
level management decisions that have a more direct influence on operations.  
Labor expenses account for the largest proportion of operating expenses so food retailers
are naturally interested in evaluating the impact of labor on value-added at the store level.  From
the translog model the input elasticities measure the change in store value-added in response to
one percent increase in labor used and are shown in table 3.  The input elasticity for the ith factor
is defined as 
and the elasticity of scale is the sum of the input elasticities, .  The input elasticity for
full-time employees is 0.46 which is about 16 percent higher than that for part-time employees
(0.399).  All the input elasticities including the store size input are significantly different from
zero.  The input elasticities for labor and store size were evaluated for retail establishments
across four categories for store selling area (0 - 25  percentile, 26 - 50  percentile, 51  - 75th th st th
percentile, and 75   - 100 ).   The input elasticities for both full-time and part-time labor bothth th
increase with store selling area, foreshadowing the productivity enhancing effects of large,
national chains in retail operations. 
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The input elasticity for the part-time employees shows that part-time employees in self-
distributing chains are more productive than their counterparts in wholesaler supplied operations. 
The productivity of labor (both full-time and part-time) is about 13 percent higher in stores in
self-distributing chains, an effect which is statistically significant.  Self-distributing stores are
able to generate a greater change in value added for each unit of labor employed. 
The calculated returns to scale measure is 1.06 which is not significantly different from
one, implying essentially constant returns to scale.  Using an aggregate cost function for U.S.
retail food stores based on value added at retail and three inputs including intermediate services,
capital, and labor, Ratchford (2003) found slightly decreasing returns to scale.  Our results for
returns to scale align with those reported by Betancourt and Malanoski (1999) who found
constant returns to scale with respect to output for a sample of U.S. supermarkets.  The evidence
on economies of scale presented by Oi (1992) in which larger sized stores are driven by lower
operating costs are not confirmed by these results. 
The coefficient on the human resources index measure indicates that a standard deviation
increase in the index increases value added by about 3.6 percent or about $2,138 per week.  The
impact of human resource practices on value added varies with the number of stores under
common ownership.  Independent stores show the smallest gain from HR practices as value
added increases by $1,044 while stores in a common ownership group of 50 or more attain an
increase in value added of $3,711.  
The  productivity effects of individual components of the HR index were examined by
disaggregating each component of the index and including the components in the model.  The
results show that the compensation package of benefits and incentives has the largest positive
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effect on store level productivity at 13.8 percent.  There is significant variety in the benefits and
incentives packages offered to employees across the stores in the Supermarket Panel.  The most
frequently observed portfolio consists of 5 benefits and incentives (from nine listed) but this
choice only accounts for a 22 percent share;  stores do choose portfolios in each of the count
categories ranging from 0 to 8.  The implication is that stores are able to adjust the package of
benefits offered and information linking specific packages to changes in value added could prove
beneficial to store managers.  For example, a package of the five most common benefits
(individual health insurance, family health insurance, disability insurance, a company funded
pension, and a 401(k) plan) which is provided by about 10 percent of food retailers increases
store level productivity by 3.6 percent.  
The statistically significant effect for membership in a self-distributing group reveals that
these stores attain a value added which is about 15 percent higher than wholesaler supplied
stores.  Retail analysts link the effectiveness of Wal-Mart’s supercenters to its superior self-
distribution network while Kmart's competitive disadvantages were due in part to its lack of a
self-distribution system.  Self-distribution is recognized by retail analysts as a method to reduce
supply chain costs and achieve greater efficiency, allowing stores to expand margins, improve in-
stock availability and enhance store productivity.
The binary variable for union workforce has a statistically significant, positive effect
implying that value added is about 19 percent higher in these retail operations.  King, Jacobson,
and Seltzer (2002) report that sales per labor hour, sales per square foot of selling area, and gross
margin as a percent of sales are all higher in stores with a union workforce.  They also note that
hourly payroll expenses are more than $3.00 higher in stores with a union workforce.  The
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upward shift in weekly gross margin provides some justification for higher wages for union
workers, since the marginal product of labor, given store selling area and total labor hours, will
be higher in stores with a union workforce.  Black and Lynch (2001) report that bundling of
specific practices (such as total quality management, profit sharing for nonmanagerial workers)
combined with unionization may have a positive impact on productivity.  Results from this study
based on Supermarket Panel data show that interaction effects between the HR practices and
either  membership in a self-distributing group or unionization are not significant.
Measuring Store Level Efficiency 
Table 4 shows the mean performance efficiency for the food retailing establishments,
overall and by fixed effects components.  The mean efficiency estimate was 0.86 across the
complete set of supermarkets, with 38 percent of stores achieving a rating above 0.90.  The
economic impact of the inefficiency measure at the store level is a loss of value added of about
$6,500 dollars per week.  Barros (2005) estimated a stochastic frontier model for 64 Spanish
supermarkets and reports an average technical efficiency of 0.864 and constant returns to scale,
results which align closely with our findings.  Keh and Chu (2003) examined annual retail
productivity for 13 grocery stores for 10 years using a DEA approach and found increasing
returns to scale but do not link technical efficiency scores to store format, store size, or human
resource practices which are key levers available to store managers to influence performance.  
To provide additional insight into how strategies on HR practices influence efficiency, we
define establishments which score above the mean on the HR index as high HR establishments. 
Low HR establishments comprise the set of remaining stores.  Efficiency is not adversely
influenced by human resource practices as the difference in efficiency estimates (table 4)
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between the high HR and low HR establishments is quite small.  Evaluated on the basis of
technical efficiency, retailers choosing a portfolio of human resource practices which score high
on the HR index are able to match the performance of competitors pursuing an alternative
strategy.  The loss in value added ranges from $9,318 for high HR establishments to $4,611 for
low HR workplaces. The high HR retailers also benefit from a higher average value added, which
at an average of $79,696 per week is over twice as large as that recorded by low HR
establishments ($38,598 per week).  Similar results are apparent when comparing the
performance of food retailers with HR indexes in the bottom quartile against the performance of
food retailers ranking in the top quartile of the HR index.  Technical efficiency at the store level
is not adversely impacted when promoting HR practices for employees. 
Productivity in food retail stores does respond to changes in use of full-time and part-time
employees and this effect differs across high HR stores and low HR stores.  The input elasticity
for employee hours (both full-time and part-time in table 3) is significantly larger for high HR
stores (0.91) than for low HR stores (0.82).  These results suggest that investments in human
resource practices influence the quality and service orientation of the workforce so that
adjustments in  hiring patterns have a greater positive impact on store level value added.  
The managerial implications of the model can be developed by examining the impact on
store level gross margins due to the change in value added implied by the stochastic frontier
model.  Gross operating margins are closely followed by retail analysts and used by investment
analysts to predict operating earnings per share.  If sales decline at the same rate as value added
due to store level inefficiency, the resulting gross profit margin for the store would be smaller by
10.4 percent.  A decline of this magnitude would be closely watched by both store level
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executives and equity analysts.  Both high HR establishments and low HR establishments would
face similar declines in gross margin.  However, the gross profit margin for the high HR
establishments is higher (at 25.2 percent) than that reported by low HR establishments (24.7
percent) and would not be as adversely impacted by the shock. 
A final point is to compare our results with recent research on productivity trends in the
retail sector while examining whether results that are apparent for labor productivity measures
are transmitted to the value added measures used by retailers.  Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan
(2006) highlight entry by large, national chains as a key component enhancing retail productivity,
as the chains displace less productive single-unit establishments. 
Information is available from the Supermarket Panel on the number of stores under
common ownership facilitating a comparison between efficiency estimates from single-unit
establishment and multi-unit stores.  Membership in a larger group (GSize) did not play a
significant role in the productivity model for food retailers.  A similar result reveals that technical
efficiency for single-unit store is indistinguishable from that attained by multi-unit food retailers. 
The restructuring of the retail trade sector towards large, national chains is a recent development
in food retailing driven by the entry of Wal-Mart and the effects may not be apparent yet in the
Supermarket Panel. 
High paying establishments are defined as food retailers with earnings per worker above
the mean.  Food retailers achieving high productivity also generate high earnings per worker as
73% of high value retailers are also high paying establishments while only 17% of low value
retailers are high paying.  These results align with Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer (2006) who
report a key empirical regularity that high productivity workplaces typically have high earnings
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per worker. The stochastic frontier model allows us to examine the performance of food retailers
on both a productivity (value added) and an efficiency basis.  Establishments that score high on
both measures (productivity and efficiency) again are the highest paying establishments. 
Model Verification 
We treat the HR Index measure (and its interaction term with group size) as endogenous
variables and test for potential bias using a Wu-Hausman test.  A set of five instruments was
identified which are correlated with the HR practices observed in the store.  Store adoption of a
suite of 16 service offerings (such as bagging service, custom meat cutting, home meal delivery,
loyalty card programs, home meal replacement, video department, banking, and so on) , the
competitive positioning of the store as a price, service, quality, or variety leader, and decision
sharing practices with outside brokers or vendors on pricing, shelf space allocation, displays and
promotions were used as instruments.  Two additional indicators are whether the store underwent
a major remodeling such as significant new departments, equipment or changes in store
dimensions or a minor remodeling, which involved only a replacement or change in equipment
were also included. 
The instruments are valid because are they show a strong correlation with the human
resource practices of the store.  Decisions by food retailers on services, competitive positioning,
decision sharing, and remodeling outcomes influence the training, skill levels, type of workforce,
and the type of compensation packages that will be offered by the store.  We do not expect that
the instruments will be significantly influenced by unobserved, short-term shocks that compose
the error term in the model for value added.  Decisions on service offerings and competitive
positioning reflect long-term strategies of the food retailer.  Decision sharing practices involve
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information needs and capabilities of external vendors and brokers which are not driven by the
short-term marketing, assortment, and pricing decisions that influence sales and value added at
the store level.  The test statistics confirm that endogeneity is not a significant factor in the
specification of the value added model as the calculated P  value of 1.374 was below the critical2
2value P  at any conventional significance level.  2
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Retail managers are frequently interested in relating store level performance to specific
management or human resource strategies.  Berman and Evans (2001) outlined strategies
available to retailers to enhance net profit margin (related to our value added measure) and
mentioned store level adjustments such as lowering labor costs, reducing costs by emphasizing
self-service, or selling exclusive product lines.  This study presents results from a stochastic
frontier analysis of U.S. food retailers using a unique data set from a national survey of
supermarkets.  We place particular emphasis on linking productivity and efficiency to human
resource practices adopted by food retailers.  A measure which captures critical components of
the human resource strategies pursued by the food retailers is identified including information on
new employee training, training of key employees,  the relative proportion of full-time to part-
time employees, benefits and incentives offered to full-time and part-time employees, and the
uniformity of benefits and incentives provided to employees. 
The empirical work documents that food retailing firms which score higher on the HR
index attain better performance.  The coefficient on the human resources index measure indicates
that a standard deviation increase in the index increases value added by about 3.6 percent.  The
statistically significant effect for membership in a self-distributing group reveals that these stores
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attain a value added which is about 15 percent higher than wholesaler supplied stores.  Retail
managers could use these results to focus on identifying the optimal set of HR practices in order
to improve store performance. 
The stochastic frontier identifies the technical efficiency effects of human resource
practices.  The mean efficiency estimate was 0.86 across the complete set of supermarkets and
efficiency is not adversely influenced when food retailers pursue a “high road” human resource
policy. Evaluated on the basis of technical efficiency, retailers choosing a portfolio of human
resource practices which score high on the HR index are able to match the performance of
competitors pursuing an alternative strategy. 
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Table 1.  Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics for Food Retailing Establishments   
Variable Description Mean
Standard
Deviation
Survey
Questiona
ValAdd Value-added ($/week) $56,556 $53,810 Q52, Q54
SSize Store selling area (square feet) 28,100 22,747 Q8
FTHrs Full-time labor (hours per week) 1,032.9 909.7 Q20
PTHrs Part-time labor (hours per week) 896.7 785.9 Q20
NwEmpTrn Training hours for new hires such as cashiers 31.46 17.26 Q18
KyEmpTrn Training hours for store managers, grocery
department managers, and scanning
coordinators 
40.10 60.90 Q19
FtPtRati Proportion of full-time to part-time
employees hired at the store 
0.54 0.16 Q20
IBComp Compensation package of benefits and
incentives offered to full-time and part-time
employees 
5.70 3.46 Q25
UnifComp Benefits and incentives offered to both full-
time and part-time employees 
1.95 1.93 Q25
GSize Ownership group size (number of stores) 199.3 536.9 Q14
SelfDist Member of a self-distributing group, 1 if yes 0.37 0.48 Q15
Union At least 25% of employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, 1 if yes, 
0.24 0.43 Q25
Convl Conventional format, 1 is yes 0.64 0.48 Q30
FoodDrug Food/drug format, 1 if yes 0.23 0.42 Q30
SCenter Warehouse, Supercenter, Super Warehouse
format, 1 if yes 
0.09 0.29 Q30
27
Superstore Superstore format, 1 if yes 0.04 0.2 Q30
 The question number for each variable in the 2002 Supermarket Panel Annual Report.a
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Table 2.  Stochastic Frontier Parameter Estimates for Food Retailing Establishments 
   Base Model Disaggregated HR Index
Parameter Variable Estimate  Estimate  a a
Intercept -9.283* -8.370*
(-3.044) (-3.117)
SSize 0.954 0.810
(1.110) (0.982)
FTHrs -0.064 0.111
(-0.101) (0.155)
PTHrs -0.012 -0.314
(-0.027) (-0.546)
SSize * SSize -0.055 -0.074
(-0.714) (-0.856)
FTHrs * FTHrs 0.086* 0.063
(2.619) (1.288)
PTHrs * PTHrs 0.049* 0.009 
(4.599) (0.259)
SSize * FTHrs 0.006 0.047
(0.055) (0.393)
SSize * PTHrs 0.048 0.091
(0.751) (1.164)
FTHrs * PTHrs -0.105* -0.010
(-2.351) (-1.260)
HR Index 0.045*
(1.896)
NwEmpTrn 0.023 
(0.628)
 KyEmpTrn  -0.031
(-1.466)
FtPtRati -0.205*
(-0.958)
 IBComp    0.136*
29
(2.780)
UnifComp -0.072
(-1.494)
GSize 0.00003 0.00006
(0.692) (1.143)
SelfDist 0.142* 0.084
(2.822) (1.531)
Union 0.174* 0.181*
(3.860) (3.494)
GSize * NwEmpTrn 0.00003 
(0.822)
 GSize * KyEmpTrn  -0.00001
(0.292)
GSize * FtPtRati -0.00008*
(-1.807)
 GSize * IBComp    0.00007
(0.072)
GSize * UnifComp -0.00005
(-0.528)
 
2 4.979*
(8.356)
vF  0.243*2
(17.376)
 
P 0.773*
(4.013)
Log Likelihood -66.617 
Number of Observations 325
 Asterisk indicates asymptotic t-values (shown in parentheseses) with significance at " = 0.10a
level.  
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Table 3.  Estimated Input Elasticities for Food Retailing Establishments
With Respect to Input of 
SSize FTHrs PTHrs
Overall Elasticities 0.199 0.464 0.399 
Stores Size (by quartiles) 
Less than 12,000 ft 0.268 0.393 0.356 2
Between   12,000 - 22, 000 ft 0.209 0.463 0.367 2
Between   22,000 - 40,950 ft 0.187 0.486 0.416 2
Greater than         40,950 ft 0.142 0.512 0.447 2
Self-distributing stores 0.164 0.499 0.430 
Wholesaler-supplied establishments 0.222 0.442 0.379
High on HR Index 0.173 0.518 0.396 a
Low on HR Index 0.223 0.415 0.405 
 
 Indicates the establishment scores above the mean on the HR index measure.a
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Table 4.  Efficiency Decomposition for Human Resource Practices of Food Retailers
Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Overall Efficiency 325 0.863 0.090 0.176 0.966 
High on HR Index 156 0.862 0.104 0.176 0.958a
Low on HR Index 169 0.864 0.074 0.497 0.966 
High on Specific Component of HR Indexb
New Employee Training 144 0.859 0.094 0.198 0.958 
Key Employee Training 111 0.848 0.090 0.543 0.944 
Full-time to Part-time  156 0.863 0.074 0.561 0.958 
Benefits and Incentives 167 0.859 0.102 0.176 0.957 
Uniformity of Benefit & 159 0.861 0.102 0.176 0.954
          Incentives
 Indicates the establishment scores above the mean on the HR index measure.a
 Indicates the establishment has adopted the human resource management practice identified. b
